



LESSONS FROM LE ROY'S LANDSCAPES

**EXPLORING A PHILOSOPHY OF DURATION, INTUITION AND
DESIRE-PRODUCTION**

Stella Groenewoud - Theory Thesis

LESSONS FROM LE ROY'S LANDSCAPES

EXPLORING A PHILOSOPHY OF DURATION, INTUITION AND DESIRE-PRODUCTION

Stella Groenewoud
stellagroenewoud@gmail.com

Architecture Theory Thesis
AR2AT030

4159136 / 03-06-16
Tutor: Stavros Kousoulas
Spring Semester '16

ABSTRACT

The natural processes and resident participation as essential parts of the landscape architecture of Louis G. Le Roy reveal a thinking of time that flourished in the philosophy of Henri Bergson in the beginning of the previous century and again in the later 60's and 70's when modernised and completed by Gilles Deleuze. The 'ecotecture' is the embodiment of Bergson's philosophy of time as duration, as a heterogeneous multiplicity in which the dialectical relationship between the here-and-now and the long term is dissolved. Time is seen as the driving force of a perpetual becoming, an actualisation of the virtual, in contrast to a passive passage through a sequence of preplanned or predictable events. This 'real' or natural time allows coincidence and contingency and acknowledges complexity which is continuously embodied in the unfolding of the future. Le Roy's theory against the 'switched-off self' and the growth of his projects through a continuous co-creation as a human act can be further explored with the second important Bergsonian notion: that of intuition as a method. Intuition as neither instinct nor intelligence, but a precise method presupposing duration that rediscovers the 'true articulations of the real'. It works from inside of the project, with time and memory as the driving forces, as opposed to working via abstract representations. Whereas words and symbols categorise by nature, intuition as a method acknowledges all differences and heterogeneity from within the system.

Bergson maintains that the time of the clock is a construction reasoned by a rational self and that duration is sensed by a deeper, more natural self: the *moi profond*. This heterogeneous being has found its climax in continental philosophy as the schizo-subject of Deleuze and Guattari: a nomadic self, free and creative, that is an ever producing desiring-machine. Desire is here not outsourced and replaced (as in capitalism), but free from oppression and territorialism. Within the process of schizophrenia the past enables instead of constrains the present. Production and the produced object melt together, whereas the subject is of no importance - the schizoid is a non-ego, eco-social and one with nature. This theory of an architecture of duration, intuition and desire leads to a new modesty, not as an indifferent determinism but a renewed awe for the complexity of everything; let us immerse again in the entity and nature and time, what we *are* and are inside of, after all, we cannot oppress.

Key words: virtuality, reality, clock time, duration, intuition, desire-production, time-based architecture, Le Roy, ecotecture, Bergson, Deleuze, Guattari, schizophrenia, production.

Pictures on following page: the Ecocathedral near Mildam, Friesland. Photos by author, taken on 25/03/2016. Picture on front page: fresh paving stones. By author, taken on 25/03/2016.



ABSTRACT

- I. INTRODUCTION**
- II. LE ROY AND HIS TIME**
- III. LE ROY IN THIS TIME**
- IV. CONTEMPORARY ECOTECHTURE**

- V. DIVIDED TIME**
- VI. DURATION**
- VII. SYSTEMS IN TIME**
- VIII. A SYNTHESIS**

- IX. INTUITION**
- X. IN, OUT & OUT**
- XI. THE ARCHITECT AS CATALYST**

- XII. THE MOI PROFOND & THE SCHIZOID**
- XIII. POLYVOCAL DESIRE**
- XIV. SCHIZO NATURA**

- XV. CONCLUSION**

- XVI. EPILOGUE: TIME AND FREE WILL**

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SHORTLIST

CRITICAL APPARATUS

*All our intuitions mock
the formal logic of the clock
All real perception, it would seem
Has shifting contours like a dream*

*The intellect
That parts the cause from the effect
And thinks in terms of space and time
Commits a legalistic crime
For such an unreal severance
Must falsify experience*

W.H. Auden (1941)¹

I. INTRODUCTION

Aerial photo's of the rural landscape around the Frisian village of Mildam show nothing more than a typical plaid, checkered with light green meadows and dark green forests. One of those rectangles, however, cloaks a rare piece of landscape underneath the trees. This is where artist and author Louis G. Le Roy started his *Ecocathedral* in 1965, a project invented to make the processes between man and nature visible. Once in a while trucks from the municipality drive by to leave behind humps of left-over curbs, bricks and paving stones, after which over the following weeks Le Roy and the neighbouring residents would distribute them in the forest. The stones form the building blocks of an architecture held together by natural cement; the overgrowth of plants and nesting of all sorts of animals. The Time Foundation, established after Le Roy's death in 2012, ensures the continuation of the project to at least the year 3000, in which the cathedral should be around 200 meters high.

Over the years I have seen the project many times. During his lifetime Le Roy sometimes appeared to me in the distance; blended into his wilderness, bended over a pile of stones rearranging their composition. His dedication and unconditional perseverance reminded me of the postman Ferdinand Cheval and his Palais Idéale in Southern France². This seems to be a shallow similarity with the knowledge of hindsight; Le Roy's architecture can be called 'intuitive', but is certainly not naive. On the contrary, what make his projects most interesting is the fact that the way of building is meticulously thought of. As a nature specialist, keeping apart every beetle and bee, Le Roy knew

what he was doing; he discovered that the stones would suck up water and thus be solid ‘water towers’ when stacked, keeping the surrounding grounds soft and moist. The masses of the stone piles could regulate the temperature very precisely and the different surface textures were known to hold all sorts of plants and mosses and together form a breeding ground for a diversity of insects.

Walking through this ‘ecotecture’ is an uncommon experience; both undrawable and incomprehensible like a wild forest (all attempts to map the place do not do it justice) and surprisingly humane; a climb that first appears too high has secret stairs and every leap that seems too far has a hidden ‘handle’. The landscape is the engraving of decades of desire lines. Never are the Le Roy’s projects, which include next to the Ecocathedral also the Kennedylaan in Heerenveen and the Lewenborg neighbourhood in Groningen, the expression of one creative genius. They are the deliberate performance of a philosophical vision in which the wildness and complexity of nature and the ritual of moving and building itself come together very directly.


Le Roy based his philosophies on the writings of Henri Bergson, a French philosopher from the beginning of the twentieth century who’s main theory is about another perception of time; time as a non-linear multiplicity, as a duration. Not only in the 60’s and 70’s a revival of his ideas was felt in society, especially the last years Bergson is gaining popularity again. “*Fleeting Zeitgeist makes Bergson beloved again*”³, the newspaper Trouw headlined in 2014 (Südholter), while in only a few years time the books *Bergson* (Van Dongen, 2014), the popular duology of philosopher Joke Hermsen (2009; 2014) and the translations of *Time and Free Will* (2014) (Bergson, 1889) and *Bergson, an Introduction to his Work* (2015) (Kolakowski, 1985) arrived in the Dutch bookstores. As Le Roy is a builder who actively spent his life solidifying this philosophy of duration, then what story do his projects tell us now? Could we as present-day designers learn present-day lessons from these philosophies set in stone?

II. LE ROY AND HIS TIME

In the beginning of the 60’s, while society stood on the verge of a new era, the power of policymakers still was felt through a closed and hierarchically structured system that dated back to the time of the Reconstruction. While in urban planning even an increase of regulations and rationalism established itself, many artists, authors and philosophers started the search for more humanistic ideas that signified individual freedom and creativity (Mous, 2016). Throughout Europe the influence of the writings of the Situationists and Henri Lefebvre in which the complexity of urban development and the social production of space was acknowledged, increased. Johan Huizinga’s

Homo Ludens (1938) on the element of play in culture and society gained renewed attention and appeared among others in the architectural ideas of COBRA-artist Constant Nieuwenhuijs and his New Babylon. Le Roy's ideas are in this sense most obviously an ecological thinking as a counterculture against the ultimately planned and fixed 'green-strip', but also focus on resident participation and co-creation. The making, as an act of playfulness and a celebration of individual creativity is essential.

It is a small step to understand that the Le Roy's landscapes are not only built in and with space, but most of all in and with time. As an author Le Roy actively joined the ongoing debate of the reification of time, mostly written about by the French philosopher Guy Debord (1931 - 1994) (Mous, 2016). In the *Société du Spectacle* Debord states that the experience of time in modern consumerist culture is alienating, as the subject is more and more detached from it and degenerates into a spectator from the outside. Time has become a measurable 'thing', convertible to money in a material society (1967). "In concise statements he brings a clear analysis of the current situation [...] [completely different] when opposed to the time of Bergson", Le Roy stated in the first sentences of his article *Onze Spectaculaire Samenleving* (1975). "[however] Debord criticises the contemporary society, but makes no contribution to a solution."⁴



In finding that solution Le Roy dedicated his life. As Debord's thinking died as a critique that became an increasingly abstract and radical antithesis, Le Roy wanted to evoke the dialectics again (Mous, 2016). In his writings he attempts so by formulating a scheme of Culture and Counterculture, which shows a cultural rhythm that revolves around a balanced middle-line (1973). When inclined to one side, idealists and pioneers start 'breeding' on ways to flip common sense around again, 'bottom-up' in the most intellectual sense.

Le Roy identified himself as such a pioneer and found his purpose in recapturing a lost perception of time. A time of eternality, that is, that he defined by referring to ancient religions that passed on their heritage and allotted upon their offspring to continue their culture. The immediacy and spectacularity of modern entertainment, that according to Debord, create a false consciousness and alienation, was

tipped too heavily to one side. Both Le Roy and Debord brought this in relation to an ultimate passivity of the modern human being (Mous, 2014). The *switched-off self* ('de uitgeschakelde mens')⁵, Le Roy called him.

III. LE ROY IN THIS TIME

'*Our Spectacular Society*', Le Roy's most elaborated theoretical essay, has heard quite some critique over the years. Contemporary critics mention his idea of culture and counterculture exactly is a deterministic way of thinking (Mous, 2016). Seeing both history and future as an everlasting repetition of a set pattern seems a retrospective analysis of a simplified past, instead of a genuine portrayal recognising its complexity. In contradiction to the relativity and perspective you would expect within such a deterministic thinking, Le Roy's own anti-culture is more than ever a set truth, an antithesis that explicitly rejects other ways of thinking. His idea that the modernist monotony is connected to immediacy and fixedness drives to the idealist anti-vision that speaks about the long term (Mous, 2016) - but in a way this devotion to eternity is just as unilateral. Le Roy called his own work 'spectacular', which is not understood by many: did Debord not call spectacles tautologies in which the means and the goal are the same (Mous, 2014)? In other words: in the heyday of modernism a reintroduction of the ecological, creative, implicit and subtle, underlining the importance of context and human values comes into being, but Le Roy's article in itself seems not to acknowledge this. In general, I think, it seems too incomplete to do justice to what his landscapes entail.

The projects themselves seem to have a renewed and surprisingly contemporary significance again and again. It is Le Roy's philosophy that because of the general theoretical attention for the virtual, process-thinking and complexity grew outdated, but his 'reality checks' only grew older and wiser. Hence, I will focus on the ecotecture itself from now on, in a broader context of contemporary theory.

IV. CONTEMPORARY ECOTECHTURE

When I used to walk through the Ecocathedral I was mostly charmed by the eternity of it all. Although the landscape is actually is no older than the surrounding forests, it feels so as the placement of every single brick entails all the years that passed since the first. The idea that this process will go on far beyond the lives of all now living human beings is sensible in every step. The

stones set, next to the consumerist culture of the city, a certain slowness, a renewed interest, respect and awe for the rhythms of nature. Later it struck me that next to the modernist ideals, rationalisation and pre-planned stamps of building blocks and ‘green-strip’ Le Roy hated so much, the landscapes also show the ‘act of making’ (Mous, 2014). Instead of letting the visitors become passive spectators, they really do become a part of the project by deepening their own desire lines. The beauty of the place lies in the daily, the reoccurring ritual of building up the stones, walking and climbing through the landscape and the humanity that underlies that routine. Performance art in its most approachable sense.

Some time periods show more than others a dilatation, even detachment, of the here-and-now and long term processes. In a 60’s society where pop-art was the celebration of mass-made amusement and rational modernist planning represented the overall ideals, a certain naturalness of time came to fade away. Is the feeling that Le Roy’s projects regained a contemporary meaning, especially over the last years, the result of a similar feeling? I am not sure to say, but a certain alienation towards time, natural rhythms and nature seems not unthinkable in a decade of globalisation, mass-urbanisation and a 24-hour economy. We live in the splits between a hasty economy and a sustainability debate, whilst our personal lives are planned as productively as possible under the regime of the clock. *“The climate asks for less, the economy for more, humanity asks for slowing down, the society for speeding up”* (Hermsen, 2009).⁶

What exact interpretation we should give the ideas that underlie Le Roy’s ecotecture in our modern-day society I do not yet know, but it is surely because of a personal feeling of significance and fascination that I approach this field of time-based architecture and ‘temporal’ philosophy with freshened interest. I want to explore the theoretical basis of that underlie Le Roy’s work and writings, that from the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859 - 1941) and his *L’Évolution Créatrice* (1907) beyond what Le Roy made of it to explore what exactly is the core of this thinking. What is interesting in Le Roy’s landscape architecture, I think, can be explained by more than its ‘longness’ as an anti-modernist counterculture as he explained it himself, but also by both exploring time as duration and the second important Bergsonian notion, that of intuition as a method. To understand the ideas that underlie Le Roy’s ecotecture better in contemporary society, I will put them in a broader theoretical framework, explicitly the poststructuralist context of Gilles Deleuze and his cooperations with Felix Guattari. Especially this philosophy of duration and intuition, is interesting while embracing complexity and individual differences. It flourishes within a continuous schizophrenic search and (de)construction.

Ultimately, I hope, I can answer a question that has been in my mind for a long time: should we fill the world with wet bricks and moist mosses? If not, what are the broader lessons we can learn from Le Roy in the light of the 21st century?

“The world has since long had a dream of a time, from which she just needs the consciousness to actually live it”, Debord wrote.⁷ Where Bergson attempted to capture this dream in words, Le Roy built it in stone.

Matter or mind, reality has appeared to us as a perpetual becoming. It makes itself or it unmakes itself, but it is never something made.

*Henri Bergson in Creative Evolution (1907)*⁸

V. DIVIDED TIME

More than ever our daily lives are defined by the clock. Productivity is measured in words per minute, kilometres an hour or KB per second, and the economy is running for 24 hours a day. Both at work and elsewhere time is something which we can have (or mostly ‘have not’) and efficiency is key when turning minutes into money or memories is our stressful task. We imagine ourselves living on a ‘timeline’ on which we move consistently forward and try our best to make the most of every moment (Hermsen, 2009). Time feels like our only genuinely finite resource; every second that passes will never come back again and brings us one step closer to the end.

This view on time as a straight line on which we pass forward may look self-evident, but is in its linearity in fact contemporary and Western. Ever since it became the main instrument of the natural sciences, it is the leading ‘standard view’ of the continents whose beliefs revolve around the scientific method. This always works with Δt , the measured time of the one moment minus that of the previous, and thus runs conclusions on what must have happened in between. This thinking is causal-mechanistic; we can exactly predict the situation at $t + \Delta t$ determined by a specific set of measurable variables - we know when the apple touches the ground, the bullet hits the body and the rocket reaches its full speed. The ‘possible’, being the predicted situation, is in this sense an image of the reality it will be later. It is a representation which is limited in all directions as the outcome is already set (Kwinter, 2001).

This deterministic consideration is called the modern standard view or phenomenological view and comes in particular from the formal and homogeneous schematisation from Husserl’s lectures *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (1893 - 1917) (Al-Saji, 2004). It comes together with phenomenology and natural sciences that investigate phenomena, or *things*. The sensory experience and the measurements of their properties is done in the most isolated context, like a laboratory space, to not bias the outcomes. The rational side of the Cartesian dual ‘self’ takes the lead in this quantitative research, that is carried out as objectively as possible.

For over a century, however, philosophers have argued this view is schematic and in a sense not *real* (Kwinter, 2001). As all *things* are measured as if they are static, the vision of time that is created from this thinking is cut up, like a series of stills from a movie that give the suggestion of movement but never actually move. Abstract laws are like mortar to rejoin the sections (Kwinter, 2001), but the actual inertia of everything is literally left out of the picture. Two properties of time this standard view fails to account; firstly its passage and secondly the complex relationship between the past and the present. Time is the thread that runs through a series of successive points (Al-Saji, 2004), a flat temporality that is an infinite addition of ‘presents’, but does not *pass*. These ‘presents’, in different degrees of intensity, take over the whole existence of time (Al-Saji, 2004) and make the past only explainable in relation to it. “*It is as if the past were trapped between two presents: the one which it has been and the one in relation to which it is past.*”⁹, Deleuze states in *Difference and Repetition* (1968). The past is the predecessor of the present, but is actually the same except it occurs at a different moment. Is time as we experience it, however, not more complex? “*The heterogeneous relations of the past and present give rise to our experiences of temporalisation and remembrance*”, Al-Saji mentions (2004), “*but in this phenomenological view these occasions seem surprising and even aleatory.*”¹⁰

A fixed, pre-planned, controllable view on time and spatial design brings monotony, says Le Roy (1973), which is a ‘challenge’ to nature and therefore always needs pruning, clipping and weeding. “*Nature itself is wild, indifferent, and accidental; it is a ceaseless pullulation and unfolding, a dense evolutionary plasma of perpetual differentiation and innovation*”, Sanford Kwinter argues in *Architectures of Time* (2001). “*Time always expresses itself by producing, or, more precisely, by drawing matter into a process of becoming-ever-different.*” Landscape architecture is exactly the field of design where this non-realness of our standard view on time is felt the clearest - the ‘final outcome’ of a rational and modernist planning process may be a field of grass, some trees with a set height in the street and a separating hedge between the gardens. However, Le Roy and other skeptics would object, we would fall in the trap of designing *things*. Should we instead not design *events* and celebrate their becoming-ever-different?

VI. DURATION

The French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859 - 1941) is the core thinker of an alternative to this standard view. His popularity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was cult-like; not only were his writings famous and influential in the field of philosophy, also all types of students, society ladies, poets and artists wanted to hear him speak, stood up to the windows to try to peek

through. His lecture in New York in 1913 even caused the first traffic jam in the history of Broadway. After a lost bet with Einstein and the demise in the second World War, however, the so-called ‘Bergson-boom’ slightly decreased until he became almost forgotten. It was Gilles Deleuze who reawakened the interest again with *Bergsonism* in 1966 - a revival that led to an impact across many academic and creative disciplines.

Instead of only ‘having’ time, Bergson states, we also *are* time. In moments of flow in which we can completely ‘forget the time’, moments that became rare in a society that is for the most of time subservient to the regime of the clock, we experience what he calls *real time*, a time that actually passes, characterised as duration (1889; 1907). In contradiction with the linear time that is dividable and countable, time as duration is an uninterrupted propulsion from which every part is different but inseparable from the others. As its nature is heterogeneous and complex in kind, it is impossible to give a simple explanation. Throughout all his work Bergson therefore sheds light on the concept from many different perspectives to ultimately leave us with a layered and thorough verbalisation of the concept (Lawlor & Moulard Leonard, 2016).

Duration is a qualitative multiplicity, a difficult to understand notion yet vital to grasp the core of Bergson’s thinking. The opposite, a quantitative multiplicity, is like a flock of sheep; the sheep are countable as they are separated entities in space that are juxtaposed. Moreover the qualitative difference between the sheep is not important when we perceive them as a flock - when counted they are all the same. Quantitative multiplicities are homogeneous and spatial, Bergson says, and therefore we can represent them by numbers and words: 50 sheep. Time as duration is qualitative because “*several conscious states are organised into a whole, permeate one another, [and] gradually gain a richer content*” (Time and Free Will, 1889), a description in which the word ‘several’ is even too separate and countable for what is meant. Qualitative multiplicities are *temporal* instead of spatial and heterogeneous (Lawlor & Moulard Leonard, 2016). There is no juxtaposition because nothing is distinctive from something else. Not the ‘sameness’ counts, but the differences of this multiplicity, a notion that is later adopted and extended by Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition 1968). Duration, or qualitative multiplicities in general, are twofold; they are a multiplicity, but as no divisions can be made, a unity at the same time.

Bergson uses three analogies that together sketch duration. One is a colour spectrum. Every point on the spectrum is different in shade and there are no boundaries within. However, he argues, as the image is a spatial two-dimensional representation, there is still juxtaposition, whereas pure duration is a continuous unity (Creative Mind 1934). A second analogy is given by two spools, one unwinding

a tape, the other winding it up. The problem of this analogy is directly seen as here time is represented as homogeneous; linear and possible to 'rewind'. But it does illustrate a continuous change together with an 'adding' of moments on one another - the past that grows into the present consists of all time that has passed since added up in one driving force (Creative Mind 1934). The present here is as a perpetual becoming driven by memory - the collection of all actual pasts. A third explanation of duration is that of a stretching elastic band. Every point on it, which could be seen as a 'moment', can be infinitely stretched out. Therefore 'points', or moments, have no reality, only the movement of stretching out has. The motion itself is the indivisible duration and the *things* that move are only an abstraction from it.

Duration is seeing these unreal points as vectors - a sliding point that is not only described by its mere properties on a certain moment but most of all by the tendency it has. As everything is a perpetual becoming, everything carries an inertia. The problem with the phenomenological view and phenomenology in general is that when merely relying on the senses as the starting point of experience at a specific moment, this tendency is filtered out. The continuous movement in itself is the core of experiencing this notion of time.

VII. SYSTEMS IN TIME

The modern Western systematisation of the day, the arrangement of it according to a set scheme, started in the Middle-Ages in the religious asceticism of the Christian monasteries (Kwint, 2001). A periodic system of seven canonical hours that corresponded with the different devotional periods divided the daily lives of the monks and, as the bells were heard in all surrounding villages, that of the people around it. Time had been measured and quantified in earlier eras, but never so decisive and dominant and, I would say, as the position of the sun had been the guiding element, it had always remained specific and local. The standardised Christian time brought a specific order throughout the entire (chaotic¹¹) continent, and formed for the first time a collective subjectivity - a general idea of when to eat, pray and sleep and a reset of the overall bodily sensation of appetite and tiredness (Kwint, 2001). Since the invention of the technical modern clock its regime has slipped from the domain of private faith to the public places, work and even leisure time, and has since modernism explicitly corresponded with a spatial separation within the house, production factory and the city. Clock time is, in this notational and divisional form, a homogeneous multiplicity; as a flock of sheep one could divide it by its clear cuts (mostly indeed the integers) and most importantly ignore the individual differences and simply count all instants with similar properties. Time in this sense is not only systematised, it is also generalised; it is the same for everyone, everywhere. It has a hold on

what once started as a continuum. *“The clock is part of a generalised Western technical apparatus of mastery”*, Sanford Kwinter contends, *“- an apparatus whose power derives from its capacity to vanquish time by spatialising it. How paradoxical, one may think; the origin of the clock as the demise, rather than the invention of time!”*¹²

This philosophical objection towards this powerful phenomenological view becomes explicit in the ecotecture of Le Roy, where it is a starting point for a spatial ‘design’ (or: becoming). However, while Le Roy writes mainly about nature itself, its ever-unfinished state and the complexity and biodiversity that comes with his long-term and laissez-faire approach, the landscapes are more interestingly, I would say, rebelling against this ‘having a hold on time’ and the determinism this standard view entails. It is not only unnatural in its chain-reaction-like simplicity that cuts off all complex relationships between things, it is most of all the negation of freedom and creativity. When the ‘possible’ will become real after simply following some calculable causal-mechanistic processes, it has been a pre-existing image of the real all the time; a representation as a predecessor. The actual morphogenesis would already have taken place. Clearly, Kwinter argues, not everything that is possible can be realised. *“Were it the case, the world would become saturated in a clamouring instant and historical time would be annihilated. Everything would not only happen at once, but would indeed already have ‘happened’.”* (Kwinter, 2001). Time is a closed system in which the new and unpredictable are excluded (Al-Saji, 2004) and leaves no room for coincidence and contingency (Mous,2014).

This step towards the generation of forms, or more generally the becoming of new things, is beautifully explained by Kwinter with the example of ice formed from water. One way of solidifying water is most obviously by pouring it into an ice cube tray and letting it freeze. After a calculable amount of time, Δt , the ice cubes will be solid. This process will always be the same as the cubes resemble each other as much as they resemble their mould. The collection of these cubes is a homogeneous multiplicity in itself, countable and spatial. A snow crystal, on the other hand, is different. Starting from a little speck of dust-ice, it attracts other particles part by part that slowly grow together into a complex structure. The eventual form is unknown as any fluctuation in pressure, humidity and thermal conditions and all other unexpected events are reflected in the process. The form will, additionally, never be ‘final’ in the first place; every image of a snow crystal is merely a ‘frozen’ state of a perpetual becoming. This process of actualisation is driven by time and sensitive to time as it is a co-creation between many agents. Most importantly, all time that has elapsed since the catalyst started the complex process, is captured in the form itself (2001). Every water particle that added up to the crystal was directly influenced by all other particles set, and so the next one found its place because of the behaviour of all previous particles plus this one. If we talk about systemisation,

this crystal-growth is a feedback system. It continuously updates itself. This type of system is one in which not everything could happen at once or would already have 'happened', on the contrary, it is working both in and with time.

VIII. A SYNTHESIS

In the previous chapter I wrote about a dilatation between the short- and the long term, in Le Roy's terms the spectacle versus the eternity of ancient cultures and religions. I would argue that duration is not about eternity, like Le Roy suggested, but about the synthesis. If one sees duration as a heterogeneous multiplicity the idea of either short- or long-term is out of the question as the division cannot be made in the first place. A crystal that is continuously growing through time, never has a final 'state' and so that imaginary dot on the horizon is neither close nor far away. The reality is not in the moment, but in the movement. The process of morphogenesis in itself is unity and multiplicity at once.

Of course we can see repetitive patterns in time, like days, months and years consisting of the different seasons. Instead of clear cut entities, however, there are part of a natural rhythm. I would not call them cyclic as that implies that the end is the same as the beginning which is never the case. Time is the driving force in which days and nights are condensations and dilutions, repetitive yet different.

New form is not conceived. It is coaxed out, flushed from its virtuality. The architect's job is in a sense catalytic, no longer orchestrating.

Massumi (1998)¹³

IX. INTUITION

In the final decades of the last century the elongated landscape project on the Kennedylaan in Heerenveen was lost and forgotten. It grew into an impassible wildness with pieces of debris and rampant ivy blocking its pathways. Ironically enough, this on first sight seemed to be the intention from the beginning; no municipal parks department came to interrupt and follow a set-up plan of trimming and cleaning, and as the years passed, nature had the chance to become as wild as it wanted. However, the landscape was lifeless - once designed to be continuously growing into a dynamic spontaneity, it now was as static as it could be (Mous, 2016). This event illustrates that it is not merely the long period, biodiversity and complexity of natural processes that make Le Roy's landscapes. It is the feedback-system itself that here lacks another component to drive it, a human one. This *switched-off self* that is brought back corresponds, I think, with the second notion that Bergson's thought is larded with: the notion of intuition as a method.

Intuition is next to duration the other key concept that Deleuze elaborately researches in *Bergsonism*. In contrast to how it might appear, intuition is not similar to instinct or inspiration, but exemplifies a fully developed method with strict rules that Bergson treats with precision; the philosophical 'precision' that he often emphasised as necessary (1966). Intuition is, to summarise, a form of 'immediate knowledge'. Bergson describes it as a method of division between true and false problems or questions that come with true and false solutions, which involves several mediations with the world and a plurality of meanings and irreducible multiple aspects (Deleuze, 1966).

Bergson formulates five 'rules', extracted by Deleuze, that set the framework in which we should describe his method.

1: Apply the test of true and false to problems themselves. Condemn false problems and reconcile truth and creation at the level of problems.

Complementary rule: False problems are of two sorts; 'non-existent problems', defined as problems who's very terms contain a confusion of the 'more' and the 'less'; and 'badly stated' questions, so defined because their terms represent badly analysed composites.

2: Struggle against illusion, rediscover the true differences in kind or articulations of the real.

Complementary rule: The real is not only what is cut out according to natural articulations or differences in kind; it is also that which intersects again along paths converging toward the same ideal or virtual point.

3: State problems and solve them in terms of time rather than of space.

These rules correspond with three acts of intuition that are determined by them. Firstly, this is the definition of the problems that are to be solved themselves. According to Bergson true problems cannot be given. He illustrates this with the example of a school classroom, where the teacher poses the question and the pupil's task is merely to answer it, which does in his eyes not accommodate real creation. "*The truth is that in philosophy and even elsewhere it is a question of finding the problem and consequently of positioning it, even more than of solving it.*"¹⁴ (Bergson, 1934). A speculative problem is solved as soon as it is stated, its solution only needs to be uncovered, which in itself has nothing to do with intuition as a method. "*True freedom lies in the power to decide, to constitute problems themselves*"¹⁵ (Deleuze, 1966). The second rule and its complement are about methodising the division between true and false problems as well. What we experience when we look at *things*, Bergson says, are differences in degree between them. On the scale between some of this famous complementary pairs, duration-space, quality-quantity and heterogeneous-homogeneous, the properties of these things only slide to higher and lower. As everything is observed as a mixture, we should go beyond the experience to the conditions of that experience to restore the purity and perceive the actual differences in *kind*. True problems look beyond the more and the less, and presuppose these differences in kind or, in other words, talk about the natural articulations or the real. The third rule, *state and solve problems in terms of time rather than of space*, gives, according to Deleuze, the fundamental meaning of intuition. The principal Bergsonian division is that of duration and space, and so temporality and spatiality. In space only differences in degree can be perceived. Differences in kind are never between things, but always between *tendencies*. One should therefore always 'wait until the sugar dissolves' (Bergson, 1907)¹⁶, as looking at a (spatial) sugar lump only results in problems and solutions about differences in degree, and solely the tendency of it to possibly dissolve, makes it different in kind from something else.

Intuition, in other words, is the method of stating and solving problems, and therefore creating, in the realm of time rather than of space. Intuition as an immediate knowledge comes forth from the addition of pasts, of memory for example, that is the ground where the generation of the new grows on. The 'knowledge' of a multiplicity of tendencies together, in contrast to static knowledge that comes from written down sources, is the driving force towards the next step.

X. IN, OUT & OUT

Intuition is a kind of experience, or as Bergson calls it, a *true empiricism* (1934), leading to absolute knowledge. In *The Creative Mind: Introduction to Metaphysics* he compares it to experiencing the feeling of sympathy, which makes one place oneself inside the ‘mind’ of another person. By means of this substitution, the feelings of the other can, in all their complexity, be understood. He gives another analogy to explain the concept, leading back to the colour spectrum as disclosed before. Looking at it, we can see simply the colour orange. However, if we would ‘sympathise’ with the colour orange and get in its position, in its duration, we feel a tension between an infinite amount of other colours around it, like lighter orange and yellow, darker orange and red. “*In other words, the intuition of duration puts me in contact with a whole continuity of durations, which I could, with effort, try to follow upwardly or downwardly, upward to spirit or downward to inert matter*” (1934)¹⁷. Intuition is the understanding of what is other, an understanding of a complexity of durations (Lawlor & Moulard Leonard, 2016).

In the first two letters of the word lies, I think, the essence. Intuition is understanding from within. It corresponds with the idea that we do not ‘have’ time, which would suggest some hierarchical relationship or at least a distance between time and a ‘self’, but that we ‘are’ time. Intuition as a method, therefore, limitlessly allows the complexity of the world, which brings the true problems and true solutions to light. It is a method of constant feedback and interconnectivity. This inside-ness is exactly why it is a method of duration; when perceived and understood in all its complexity from within, no representations and so countable and generalised homogeneous multiplicities (such as: 50 sheep) have to be made in the first place.

Le Roy’s landscapes are completely made from *within*. Every time a brick is placed intuitively, its position is implicitly informed by the system in all its complexity; the bricks already placed, the natural rhythms of the seasons, weather, plants and insects intertwining with them and the individual intuition of the builder itself.

The analysis as an opposite

For Bergson the opposite of absolute knowledge obtained by intuition is relative knowledge, which is acquired via analysis. With dividing the object based on a chosen viewpoint and translating the fragments into symbolic representations, knowledge generalised and therefore distorted, he argues. (1934). The idea that one can draw objective conclusions from these distorted forms of relative knowledge, is always an illusion. This top-down analytical approach of the modernist era is indeed what Le Roy rebelled against in the 1960s. The planned ‘final forms’ will be the same for every

inhabitant, in every neighbourhood in every country where the designed ‘stamps’ were put and will stay the same throughout the decades they will remain. Causal-mechanical conclusions are drawn from linear analyses.

The creative genius as an opposite

Le Roy’s landscapes certainly are non-rational and are an evident celebration of individuality and freedom. However, they are not ‘created’ in a traditional way as it seems impossible to depict the creators. Did Le Roy create the landscape? The neighbouring residents and volunteers together with him? Nature? Or time as a driving force? Intuition as a method is in another way opposite to modernism, which has to do with, unlike one would suggest at first sight, the ‘creative genius’, as cultural theorist Brian Massumi depicts the approach of among others Le Corbusier (1998). Being a rationalist and early modernist, Le Corbusier is not at all an antagonist to the analytical architect defined above, but also does not eliminate his own creativity and freedom in the process of design. Le Corbusier wrote about the architect as the creator of a symphony. In his works and writings, Massumi writes “...*creation consists in the masterful composition of aggregate forms, drawing on a preexisting vocabulary of combinable elementary forms. Creation is an individual expression of the artist at the same time as it accedes to universality.*” (1998)¹⁸. There are two reasons why this creative intuition of the architect as a master is different from intuition as a method. Firstly, this creator works so much from *within*, himself that is to say and not from within the project, that instead having the Bergsonian absolute knowledge about the complexity of things and tendencies, they are hardly informed at all. The heterogeneity of the context, the unique differences of all objects, are not of their interest. Secondly, there is a very personal search, again, for a universal. Le Corbusier was as the director of his orchestra of forms, always questing for the truth, the forever answer.

Le Roy’s ecotecture is not ‘designed’ as long as that words presupposes a designing phase before a phase of fabrication. As design in this sense happens before the project is constructed, whether it is a landscape, building, piece of furniture or a utensil, all decisions are made from outside, at the drawing board or behind the computer screen. The model where one is working with can be more or less abstract and thus may contain more or less information. It can be merely consisting of words and numbers, like the amount of square metres needed for a specific function as stated in a design brief or it can be the widely used two-dimensional drawing that contains much more precise information. A three-dimensional model, either in material or built up piece by piece in a 3D-modelling program will be, some would argue, so detailed that it is hardly to be distinguished from the real, but still there is a major difference. All abstract representations stay homogeneous multiplicities, or flock of sheep. They works, by default, with symbols that are always representing a category, like all bricks, columns or windows. As soon as a legend or dictionary is used for general descriptions or words,

lines or pieces of geometry are copy-pasted in the model, they become countable and divisible. The unique differences between them, that are according to Bergson and Deleuze to be celebrated (Baugh, 2009) are ignored. Symbols are immobile. They have no temporal component, but only exist in space (Bergson, 1934).

XI. THE ARCHITECT AS CATALYST

Regardless of the spatial qualities of the building blocks constructed in Modernist era - many architects surely had a feeling for composition, light and living space - one could argue the design is spatial and not temporal in kind. It is always designed via abstract representations and so from the outside. It will always lead to a final form which is doomed to slowly lose its quality in the time thereafter. Intuition as a method is neither about the accepted constraint given by analytical observations, nor about the amount of arbitrariness or creativity allowed, a typical design debate (Massumi, 1998). In this approach it is the division between the two that seems not to exist at all, as both constraint and arbitrariness are internal to the process. The process does not of itself generate a completed form. It generates a proliferation of forms (Massumi, 1998).

In the summer of 2012 Le Roy died at the age of 87. His projects, however, will stay actively alive for an unknown amount of decades to come. The proliferation of this architecture grew completely independent of Le Roy himself. The architect of intuition is the starter of complex processes. He is, as Massumi writes, *“more a chemist (or perhaps alchemist) staging catalytic reactions in an abstract matter of variation, than a maestro pulling fully formed rabbits of genius from thin air with the masterful wave of the drafting pencil.”* (1998)¹⁹. The architect is the catalyst of the leap from one arena of complexity into another, the starter of interactions, of interconnectivity. *“Each complex is separated not by a self-enclosure, but by an analogical gap that the process must leap. The art of the architect is the art of the leap.”*(1998)²⁰.

Desiring-production is continually overcoming the limit, becoming deterritorialised, causing its flows to escape, going beyond the threshold of representation.

Deleuze & Guattari (1987)²¹

XII. THE MOI PROFOND & THE SCHIZOID

So, how to be these catalysing architects? How could we be non-creating creators, or a creating non-creators? How could we nudge our idea of productivity as efficiency counted per measurable time unit towards a way of producing without a finish line?

Bergson explains the self as consisting of many layers that all interpenetrate at any time. A part of it, the side related to understanding the time of the clock, is ‘external’. It is rational, calculative and follows its pre-made plans. Bergson calls it solidified (Gillies, 1996). This superficial self is also our social self, as our social character and behaviour is largely filled in by a fixed external assumption. Even more than to us, it belongs to the society and what is generally expected. Duration, on the other side, is experienced by another self, that Bergson depicts as a *vital* self: the *moi profond* (1896) (Gillies, 1996). This deeper, profound self that one finds below the social crust is heterogeneous and irreducible. It is constantly changing and constantly growing, it is what Deleuze would call nomadic.

This more natural self is a widely studied subject in continental philosophy, and finds its climax in the later works of Gilles Deleuze (Hermsen, 2009). Alongside being the one bringing Bergson’s lost metaphysics of duration and intuition back to life in the 60s, he based his later, widely influential works on the core of these earlier explorations. Bergson was the backbone of his ideas (Lawlor & Moulard Leonard, 2016). I will focus on Gilles Deleuze and his collaborative works with psychotherapist Felix Guattari from here, not only because they widely elaborated on this notion of the self, but most of all because they did so in a contemporary context. Their ideas, constantly crossing a wide array of scientific and artistic fields, are written in the 80s, in a time in which science itself passed the idea of causality and moved to topology, thermodynamics, virtuality and a general idea of chaos theory and complex systems. Aside from science, it was also society that stood in the early days of its contemporary form; the *grand narratives* (Lyotard, 1979) had made place for the postmodern skeptic and the power of capitalism, one of their particular points of interest.

In his magnum opus *Difference and Repetition* (1968) Deleuze develops a metaphysics adequate to at least the first beginnings of these contemporary developments in mathematics and science. In his

writings the concept of multiplicity replaces that of substance, event replaces the thing and virtuality replaces possibility (Lawlor & Moulard Leonard, 2016). Deleuze's thought is (in)famous for its ultimate non-fixedness. It is inherently fluid. It is a constant de- and reconstruction, a search for the sake of it. Deleuze's texts are never hierarchical or cut-up. Instead of introductions, chapters and conclusions they are a continuous rhythm of contraction and relaxation (Massumi, 2004). The Bergsonian ideas of the temporal and heterogeneous multiplicity finds in the non-structurality of this text their culmination.

The moi profond finds its counterpart in the schizo-subject (Hermsen, 2009), that is written about by Deleuze and Guattari in their famous and fairly absurd *Anti-Oedipus*, the first half of 'Capitalism and Schizophrenia'. This schizo-subject and the process of schizophrenia they elaborate upon is a post-structuralist construction, and in essence a being that is never bound. The schizoid can be ultimately free as they can escape all oppressive thought. It is never susceptible to totalitarian ideas such as fascism, like the meekly and lazy mass (Foucault, 1984). *"No pain, no trouble - this is the neurotic's dream of a tranquillised and conflict-free existence. A herd instinct is based on the desire to be led, the desire to have someone else legislate life."* (Seem, 1984)²² This virtue of immunity is innate to all schizoids, but Deleuze and Guattari honour the healthy variant, that is not to be mistaken with the clinical schizophrenic that is actually sick, silent and loses track of reality in endless fantasies. The healthy schizoid is beyond us in terms of conscious awareness as their perception of the world is not spoiled by our projected truths and prejudices. The schizoid is a constant coder and decoder of their own reality and therefore the liberator of their own desire.

XIII. POLYVOCAL DESIRE

This notion of desire is the key-concept when relating the thought of Capitalism and Schizophrenia to intuition. Again, it is an idea easier to grasp when first sketched to the background of what it is not. The opposite of productive desire as outlined by Deleuze and Guattari, is desire as it is understood by both the Freudian method of psychoanalysis and by capitalism: as through the concept of acquisition. Desire here is a consequence of a lack. In psychoanalysis it is the imaginary force coming from a lack that is libidinal and related to the holy constellation of daddy-mommy-me. When unfulfilled, it leads to dreams and fantasies and the infamous associations unraveling the obscure complexes of the unconscious. In capitalism the quantitative calculations of the market replace the actual beliefs that are the foundation of society (1984). Desire here is also separated from the urge to create and substituted with actual objects - the lack becomes a literal thing. This desire is a desire projected on us from the outside. In both external interpretations the human reality and creativity that characterise

desire is destroyed. It becomes empty and above all guilty. These projected means and belief-systems leads to the paranoia, defined in terms of territories as artificial binary constructions. It is the deterritorialisation and a fundamental re-coding that can release free-form desire again (Holland, 1999).

In contrast to this desire of acquisition, Deleuze and Guattari illuminate desire of production. The universe is composed of desiring machines and social production - those desiring-machines of production, they sketch, make up a world of productive 'flows'; the chlorofyl-machine, the eating-machine, the breast/milk-machine, the talking machine etc, all coming from and eventually going back to nature. Desire is defined as an active and productive force which produces reality (1984). *"If desire produces, its product is real. Is desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. Desire is the set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows and bodies, and that function as units of production. The real is the end product, the result of the passive syntheses of desire as auto-production of the consciousness."* (1984)²³. Desire is a 'universal primary process', working beyond only beings as it is the very essence of the world (Lawlor & Moulard Leonard, 2016). Desiring-production is autonomous, self-constituting, and creative.

The schizoid, they say, is the being free to follow this desire of production. *"Schizophrenia is like love: there is no specifically schizophrenic phenomenon of entity; schizophrenia is the universe of productive of reproductive desiring-machines, universal primary production as the 'essential reality of man and nature'."* (1984)²⁴. This desire is polyvocal, or a multiplicity. It is Deleuze and Guattari's idea of schizo-analysis to unleash all parts of it, in contradiction to the Freudian method of flattening is. *"[The task of schizoanalysis] is discovering in a subject the nature, the formation or the functioning of his desiring-machines, independently from any interpretations."* (1984)²⁵. Freed from all oppression and from oppressing ourselves, we can all be creators fuelled by our desiring machines.

Two properties of desire-production are interesting when considering intuition as a method and the landscapes of Le Roy. Firstly the fact that desire, as it does not co-exist with a lack, never leads towards a goal. A fixed endpoint will always end prematurely and abruptly²⁶ or the process will be enduring indefinitely without ever reaching it, which leads to the clinical schizoid that is found back in mental institutions. Secondly, the schizophrenic being a universal producer of reality is unimportant as the producer itself. The distinction between the production itself and the product produced disappears²⁷ and they become one. *"Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject. Desire*

and its object are one and the same thing." (1984)²⁸. Therefore, the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari are, I think, specifically that of the vanishing ego. As Mark Seem (1984) in the introduction of *Anti-Oedipus* quotes Henry Miller: "*We must die as egos and be / born again in the swarm, not / separate and self-hypnotised but / individual and related.*" (Miller, 1949).

XIV. SCHIZO NATURA

The schizoid is primitive, in the most positive way. The schizoid is a being of nature as they have²⁹ projected themselves back to the time before the dichotomy between nature and culture, nature and man³⁰. "*We make no distinction between man and nature (...) Not man as the king of creation, but rather as the being who is in intimate contact with the profound life of all forms or all types of being, who is responsible for even the stars and animal life, and who ceaselessly plugs an organ-machine into an energy-machine, a tree into his body, a breast into his mouth, the sun into his asshole; the eternal custodian of the machines of the universe.*" (1984)³¹. When the schizo takes his stroll, he must feel the bliss of the profound life of every form and take in every element of nature. In reality, which is what the schizo can realise, there are no supposedly fixed elements, but there is only production. There is no thing as relatively independent spheres or circuits as everything is a complex multiplicity. Production as a process, Deleuze and Guattari formulate, takes over all idealistic categories and creates a cycle with an immanent relation to desire. Their psychiatry deals with the schizo as a *Homo Natura*.

Deleuze and Guattari, following Bergson, see the virtual as the mode of reality implicated in the emergence of new potentials. The reality of the virtual is movement itself, it is the *event*. (Massumi, 1998). This idea of the movement or inertia as reality jumps in the *Anti-Oedipus* to a crazy level of ambition; the text attempts to be a nomadic and dynamic eco-social theory of production which functions as an ontology of change, transformation and 'becoming', that at all times includes both sides of the nature/culture split (Lawlor & Moulard Leonard, 2016). This combination of ecological thinking in flows and rhythms and encompassing both culture and nature brings us back home: *Nature, Culture, Fusion* is the name of one of the most widespread books on the ecotecture of Le Roy and the fact *man is a product of both culture and nature* the first of his twelve main assumptions (Le Roy, 1973). I would argue there is no fusion as the assumed split for the real schizoid has never existed. It is a projection of the other, rational self, that in this philosophy of freedom and creativity is irrelevant.

I once said that we are building our cities today as though they are ships getting ready for a storm at sea. Everything has to be lashed down. I might say, why don't we lash down one half of the world, but respond to that by weaving a separate looser world through it as a counterculture.

Louis G. Le Roy (1972)³²

XV. CONCLUSION

In the theoretical unraveling of ecotecture, it seemed often helpful to define the concepts that underlie it by opposing them to what they are not. Firstly we juxtaposed the difficult to explain notion of duration with the linear time of the clock, but also with merely 'eternity' like Le Roy sketched it. Secondly we set the idea of intuition next to both rational constraints and the creative genius, after which it appeared to be the opposite of designing before the process of fabrication and via representations in general. The schizoid seems not to be totalitarian, meekly nor silent or clinically sick and likewise desire-production is mostly 'real' because it is not fake; it is neither an unconscious Freudian lack nor a capitalist filled-in need, nor purely cultural, nor ego.

And maybe this is the crux. These theoretical constructs and organisational systems that our thinking is mostly about, is indeed what duration, intuition and desire are not. And still, or actually therefore, they are no radical antithesis. Temporality rather teaches us that some quotidian distinctions might be no opposites at all. What Le Roy never glanced over but Deleuze and Guattari did, is that the philosophy behind duration, intuition and desire is temporal in itself. It is driven by complexity, interconnectivity and multiplicity. It is a non-spatial colour spectrum of notions: non-representational by nature.

The lessons we can learn from the landscapes of Le Roy are rich and diffuse. The essence where this theory is revolving around, however, is in my opinion unambiguous: let us as thinkers, designers and architects come to a new modesty - not a modesty of indifferent determinism, but a renewed awe for the complexity of everything. What one is *one* with, one cannot rule over, and in this interconnected³³ philosophy without dichotomies that is all of reality, or the entity of nature and time. Only when working from abstractions and systematic formats one can oppress in the first place, which is why we should immerse ourselves again in time, in the woods, the curbs, the bricks and bicycle racks. Only within the colour spectrum orange is suddenly no colour anymore but a tension between a diffuse multiplicity of reds, ambers, saffrons and yellows. We then not only see similarities of static objects,

but on the contrary, perceive the endless differences within the repetition. Let us celebrate all this diversity and feel small within its richness.

Should we put the world full of wet bricks and moist mosses? I still do not know. Bergson understood human being as a multiplicity in itself, a complex mixture between both the ratio, sensible to clock time, and the intuitive *moi profond* that was one with duration. He observed an imbalance, and devoted his life kneading the concept of duration throughout profuse analogies and examples to light it up again (Hermsen, 2009). And is it not logical that morphogenesis takes place in both space and time? The city is planned and re-planned whilst it is at the same time just ‘made’ by its inhabitants that initiate their own ideas and continuously carve their literal and figurative desire lines. Our lives seem largely defined by working routines, clocks and appointments, and still are also just ‘lived’. When it comes to architectural design, this oddly enough does not apply. Plans and sections are drawn, after which the production is outsourced to a contractor and construction company which blocks opportunities for a temporal growth, a complex expansion through time. This way of working is territorialising in the Deleuzian sense and suggests ownership and dominance. The final design patiently waits for the sign for demolition.

“The process of schizophrenia”, Holland writes (1999), *“is like improvisational jazz; the past enables instead of constrains the present. The contents go beyond the phrase.”*³⁴ Unlike what psychoanalytical and capitalist projection on the schizoid will result into, architecture of duration, intuition and desire is ultimately non-paralysing. It should be initiating people to live in and around it, and encourage them to co-create its unfolding. Implicitly it originates a renewed significance for creativity and freedom and puts humans into action, not because they are dissatisfied by the current conditions, but because they are desiring-machines.

XVI. EPILOGUE: TIME AND FREE WILL

The exhibition of the International Architecture Biennale of Rotterdam (IABR), *The Next Economy*, that takes place in Katendrecht this month (May/June 2016), starts with a five minute virtual reality tour through a ‘city of the future’. You find yourself in a futuristic apartment looking through a Google glass that gives updated statistics of all the time. Granny calls that you should come visit her in the retirement home. Within a split second the computer checks both of your heart rates, glucose levels, your agenda and that of your contacts and suggests it is a good idea to go. Or actually, it already called a cab, instructed the nurses about your visit and ordered you some tea without sugar in her room. When arrived she appears healthy and sound, which makes both devices look into your data to conclude she is better off when living with you for her final years. While the screen gives you the ‘option’ of an okay, your home is already being prepared for her coming by robots that make the bed and prepare her favourite dinner.³⁵

Debord wrote that the spectacular society was the ultimate alienation from reality. It created a false consciousness and passive people. It is a tautology as the means equal the goal, and never has a deeper meaning (1967). And how different and surprisingly similar is this dystopian sketch. When used which such short-sighted linearity, data are most paralysing and oppressing. If we fall in the trap of this determinism, why would we live in the beginning: everything has already ‘happened’. Let those rare moments in which we experience that we are living beings; moments of flow, in which the clock fools us by secretly slowing down and moments of exciting creativity in which it quietly speeds up, tell us that we are more than animal instinct intersecting the intellect that parts the cause from the effect. We are individuals of intuition.

Stella Groenewoud, 2016

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SHORTLIST

- Al-Saji, A. (2004). The Memory of Another Past: Bergson, Deleuze and a New Theory of Time. *Continental Philosophy Review*, 37, 203-239.
- Auden, W. H. (1941). *New Year Letter*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Baugh, B. (2009). G. W. F. Hegel. In G. Jones & J. Roffe (Eds.), *Deleuze's Philosophical Lineage*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Bergson, H. (1889). *Time and Free Will*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Bergson, H. (1896). *Matter and Memory*. New York: Zone Books.
- Bergson, H. (1907). *Creative Evolution*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Bergson, H. (1934). *The Creative Mind: Introduction to Metaphysics*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Campbell, E. (2013). *Music After Deleuze*. Camden: Bloomsbury Academic
- Deane, P. (1994). *At Home in Time: Forms of Neo-Augustinism in Modern English Poetry*. Quebec City: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Debord, G. (1967). *La Societé de Spectacle*. Paris: Champ Libre.
- Deleuze, G. (1966). *Bergsonism*. New York: Zone Books.
- Deleuze, G. (1968). *Difference and Repetition*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Deleuze, G., Guattari, F. (1984). *Anti-Oedipus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Deleuze, G., Guattari, F. (1987). *A Thousand Plateaus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Foucault, M. (1984). Preface. *Anti-Oedipus*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

- Gillies, M.A. (1996). *Henri Bergson and British Modernism*. Quebec City: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Gopnik, A. (2002). The Double Man: Why Auden is an Indispensable Poet of our Time. *The New Yorker*, September (23).
- Hailey, C. (2008). *Campsite: Architectures of Duration and Place*. Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press
- Holland, E.W. (1999). *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis*. London: Routledge.
- Hermesen, J.J. (2009). *Stil de Tijd: Pleidooi voor een Langzame Toekomst*. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij de Arbeiderspers.
- Hermesen, J.J. (2014). *Kairos: Een Nieuwe Bevlogenheid*. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij de Arbeiderspers.
- Huizinga, J. (1938). *Homo Ludens: Proeve eener Bepaling van het Spel-Element der Cultuur*. Amsterdam: Athaneum Boekhandel Canon.
- Kolakowski, L. (1985). *Bergson*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kwinter, S. (2001). *Architectures of Time*. Cambridge: MIT University Press.
- Lafrance, G. (1999). Bergsonian Vitalism. In S. Glendinning (Ed.), *The Edinburgh Encyclopedia of Continental Philosophy* (pp. 214-221). London: Routledge.
- Lawlor, L., & Moulard Leonard, V. (2016). Henri Bergson. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. Summer 2016)*. Forthcoming URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/bergson/>>.
- Le Roy, L. G. (1975). Onze Spectaculaire Samenleving. *Plan*, 4, 29-61.
- Le Roy, L. G. (1973). *Natuur Inschakelen, Natuur Uitschakelen*. Utrecht: Uitgeverij Ankh-Hermes.
- Le Roy, L.G., Mous, H., et. al. (2004). *Dansen tussen Fundamenten*. Mildam: Stichting Tijd.

- Le Roy, L.G., Koppandy, J. (2005). *Jules Verne en de Cybiont/Het Ecokathedrale Proces*. Mildam: Stichting Tijd.
- Lyotard, J.F. (1979). *La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir*. Parijs: Minit.
- Massumi, B. (1998). Sensing the Virtual, Building the Insensible. *Architectural Design*, 68(5/6), 16-24.
- Massumi, B. (2004). Translator's Foreword: Pleasures of Philosophy. *A Thousand Plateaus*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Miller, H. (1949). *Sexus*. New York: Grove Press.
- Mous, H. (2012). De Ecologische Wijsheid van Le Roy. Forthcoming URL = <http://www.huubmous.nl/2012/07/20/de-tegencultuur-van-le-roy/>
- Mous, H. (2014). Homo Ludens in Kosmopolis. Forthcoming URL = <http://www.huubmous.nl/2014/11/21/hotel-friesland/>
- Mous, H. (2016). *De Fries die in de Toekomst Sprong, Fries Modernisme in de jaren 60*. Leeuwarden: Uitgeverij Tresoar.
- Olivier, B. (2014). The Subject: Deleuze-Guattari and/or Lacan (in the time of Capitalism)? *Phronimon*, 15-01, 46-66.
- Seem, M. (1984). Introduction. *Anti-Oedipus*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Südholter, J. (2014). Vluchtige Tijdsgeest maakt Filosoof Bergson weer in Trek. *Trouw* (31/07).
- Teulings, R. (2004) Deleuze, Bergson, breuken in de tijd. *Metropolis M*(3).
- Van Dongen, H. (2014). *Bergson*. Amsterdam: Boom Uitgevers.
- Vollaard, P. (2002). Time-Based Architecture in Mildam: Louis Le Roy's Ecocathedral. *Nature, Culture, Fusion: Louis G. Le Roy*. Rotterdam: NAI Publishers.

CRITICAL APPARATUS

¹ This extract comes from W.H. Auden's famous long poem *New Year Letter* published in 1941. His poetry is often described as 'philosophical' as he does not express himself with concrete emotions or situations, but on the contrary stays on an abstract level of thought (Deane, 1994). The British-American poet and essayist, regained, just like Bergson and Le Roy, much popularity since the beginning of this century (Gopnik, 2002).

² The postman Ferdinand Cheval spent his life combining the stones he found on his daily route into an enormous palace in his backyard for his family and especially his daughter Alice. Le Roy had much appreciation for this project, mainly because of what one man can build in a lifetime. The architecture of Cheval is, however, the essential goal in itself, whereas the ecotecture of Le Roy is the means to an end to test and prove his philosophical theories in practice (Vollaard, 2002). Whereas the Palais Idéale is often cited as 'naive architecture', Le Roy projects cannot be listed so.

³ Original title: *Vluchtige tijdgeest maakt filosoof Bergson weer in trek.*

⁴ The image below appeared in *Onze Spectaculaire Samenleving.*

⁵ As appeared in *Our Spectacular Society*, or *Onze Spectaculaire Samenleving.*

⁶ Original quote: "*Het klimaat vraagt om minder, de economie om meer, de mens vraagt om vertraging, de samenleving om versnelling.*", as appeared on page 19 of *Stil de Tijd.*

⁷ Original quote: "*Le monde possède déjà le rêve d'un temps dont il doit maintenant posséder la conscience pour le vivre réellement.*", as appeared on page 164 of *La Societé du Spectacle.*

⁸ Page 287.

⁹ Page 80.

¹⁰ Page 3.

¹¹ In the Middle-Ages Europe consisted of many rivalling lordships.

¹² In the first chapter, *The Complex and the Singular*, as appeared on page 21.

¹³ Page 3.

¹⁴ *Creative Mind*, page 58-59.

¹⁵ Page 15.

¹⁶ Page 13.

¹⁷ Page 187.

¹⁸ Page 4.

¹⁹ Page 3.

²⁰ Page 3.

²¹ Page 345.

²² In the Introduction of *Anti-Oedipus*, as appeared on page 2.

²³ Page 39.

²⁴ Page 5.

²⁵ Page 367.

²⁶ As said on page 15 of *Anti-Oedipus*.

²⁷ As said on page 17 of *Anti-Oedipus*.

²⁸ Page 39.

²⁹ ‘They have’ here is a replacement for ‘he/she has’ to use a gender neutral form. This will appear more often in the text.

³⁰ As said on page 12 of *Anti-Oedipus*.

³¹ Page 15.

³² As appeared in *Nature, Culture, Fusion* (2002). Originally from *De Stellingen van Louis Le Roy*, uitgezonden door de VARA in april 1972. Original quote: “*Ik heb wel eens gezegd, wij bouwen op het ogenblik de steden alsof het schepen zijn, die op zee voor de storm klaargemaakt worden. Alles moet vastgesjord zijn. Ik zou willen zeggen, laten wij nu de helft van de wereld vastsjorren, maar laten we als tegenspel, als tegencultuur een losse wereld daar doorheen vlechten.*”

³³ Rhizomatic

³⁴ Page xi.

³⁵ Part of the exhibition of the International Architecture Biennale Rotterdam, *The Next Economy*, May 2016. Artist unknown.